Past Events July December 2013
This page is a scrap book of photos, descriptions, and mementos of the club's past activies.
Operation Garden Gnome
12-14 July 2013
Georgetown, TX
Seven members of the club participated in "Operation Garden Gnome", a wargame designed to explore the possibilities of a "what if" scenario, had the 6th AARR been dropped into the landing zones west of Arnhem to capture the bridges on day one of "Operation Market Garden" in Holland in September of 1944. Participants had meals of home-made egg mcmuffins, burgers on the grill and fish and chips, with plenty of liquid refreshments over the weekend. A great time was had by all, and plans are under way to do a similar wargame during the Christmas holiday season later this year to explore the "what if" scenario if "Parker Force", built around 6th AARR, had been sent on its mission to capture the village of Cagny, southeast of Caen in Normandy, on June 7th 1944, on D+1. A summary of Garden Gnome is included below.
...Pete and Susan arrived Friday night, and Toby, Kevin and Al Prendergast arrived Saturday morning. After a breakfast of Welch McMuffins, map boards, protractors, and copies of the operations order and game rules were handed out to the combatants. The operations order was briefed, and then a rehearsal conducted on the terrain board, along with a quick familiarization of the types of heavy weapons' ammunition available to the combatants. These included original examples of 37mm APBC, HE, Cannister, and Littlejohn squeezebore rounds, 2" and 3" mortar bombs, a 75mm pack howitzer casing, and a panzerschreck rocket to compare to a PIAT projectile.
The combatants took on the jobs of the commanders of 6th AARR Regimental, HQ Squadron, Tank Squadron, Recce Squadron, Royal Artillery, and A Co of the 2nd South Staffords, organized as "Stewart Force".
The operation started with a description of the events of the afternoon of 17th September 1944 from the German perspective, as the aerial bombardment and attacks by fighter bombers commenced in the Arnhem area, followed by the glider and parachute drops into the drop and landing zones. The dispositions of the german forces were briefed, along with the initial assessments of what the key german commanders thought was happening. The british unit commanders then deployed their forces on Landing Zone "Zulu", and assembled for their final briefing prior to mounting up and moving out on their missions.
Stewart force moved in Column along route "Lion", along the river road, with Recce Sqdn in the lead, followed by the Regimental Commander, then Lt Tank Sqdn, HQ Sqdn, A Co 2nd South Staffs, and the troops from the Royal Artillery, the Antitank Battery, and the Royal Engineers. Initial contact was with some german horse-drawn wagons on "Lion" in the vicinity of Phase Line "White", which were quickly dealt with. No other opposition was met while crossing Phase Lines "Cliffs" and "Dover", until the few germans and 20mm flak guarding the Arnhem road bridge were encounted at Objective "Black" were eliminated. The Tank and Recce troops quickly fanned out in the areas on both the north and south sides of the bridge, and sent troops to seize the railroad bridge at Objective "Tan" and to move south to recce the routes to Objective "Ale" on the high ground to the south of Arnhem. The rail bridge was blown as the forces approached, and a company of Waffen SS soldiers were encountered in an ambush on one of the Recce troops as they moved toward Objective "Ale" along route "Leopard". No casualties were suffered and the troop quickly withdrew and reported the contact.
The recce troop sent to check route "Puma" leading to the western end of Objective Ale encountered no opposition, and seized and held the village of Omerbegovacca and established a Firm Base there. They were given the mission of holding the town if possible and establishing OP's to report any enemy movements surrounding the village.
As A Co of the South Staffs picked up positions to relieve some of the light tank troops of their Force Protection missions guarding the perimeter and the HQ Squadron, Royal Artillery and Engineers established themselves, contact was made on Route Leopard as the leading elements of a german armoured reconnaissance battalion came over the crest of the hill to the south of Arnhem, as they headed north toward the bridge.
Fire was exchanged between the leading Puma armoured car and a locust tank from the 2nd Troop, with no hits scored. The artillery was quickly called and laid a barage on the armoured cars, who were caught in between the buildings on both sides of the road. Two Pumas were destroyed, and the german battalion deployed to both sides of the road, seeking bypasses around the british encountered.
The whole of the division's artillery was called onto the germans as they fanned out, and a few more vehicles were disabled or destroyed as a result. Darkness brought a halt to the combat on both sides and both sides reorganized and prepared for the following morning's action.
During the night, the Division Commander and his subordinates discussed the enemy's dispositions and the division's options. 2nd Parachute Battalion under Frost had made it to the bridge and relieved Task Force Stewart of the Seize and Hold mission. 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions were unable to enter Arnhem, due to strong resistance by a Waffen SS formation identified as "Kampfgruppe Krafft". During the previous evening, two troops of Locusts had been sent to reinforce the recce troop that was in Omerbegovacca. Two further troops of locusts had been dispatched to Omerbegovacca, in anticipation of the german armoured recce battalion, now identified as "Kampfgruppe Graebner", attempting to make a flank attack on the divison's perimeter in the direction of Omerbegovacca, or with the possibility of launching our own flank attack into "Kampfgruppe Graebner".
With four troops of locusts and the Squadron commander and his wingman now in Omerbegovacca, and the presence of Kampfgruppe Krafft still blocking the 1st and 3rd Para Battalion Commanders, General Urquehart decided to order Col Stewart to attack the Kampfgruppe Kraft from the rear with his tanks, in concert with a push from the paras at dawn.
The attack was successful, brreaking the kamfgruppe in two, with the broken elements on the german south flank dispersing into the fields and woods to the south, and the germans on the north flank retreating into the village of Serbodorf. The german force in Serbodorf, now being reduced to two companies, and encircled on three sides by two battalions of paras with tanks in support, withdrew.
Routes Tiger and Leopard were now clear to the west of Arnhem, allowing the rest of 1st Parachute Brigade to enter the city to join 2nd Para and reinforce the perimeter.
While Col. Stewart had been conducting the attack against the rear of Kampfgruppe Krafft, a very heavy artillery barrage descended on the tankees and reccees holding Omerbegovacca, which a smoke screen blocking all vision of the areas to the south of the village. Shortly after, three companies of SS Panzergrenadiers supported by armoured half tracks and an 88mm and 20mm gun, emerged from the smoke at point blank range to the south of the village. At the same time, armoured cars and half tracks armed with 20mm cannon emerged from the high ground and woods to the east of the village, descending on the town from that direction, supported by half tracks mounting 75mm Pak 40's firing from the hill.
Col. Stewart had been ordered to return to Omerbegovacca by General Urquehart, and his tanks were just getting back to the village in the middle of the german attack. With the locusts in the south of the village along with Col Stewart firing cannister at the troops emerging from the smoke and the direct fire of the 3" armed HQ Tetrarch firing HE, many of the attacking infantry were cut down before reaching the village. One of the returning troops of Locusts had been ordered to reinforce the east side of the village against the attack from the east.
The troop commander picked up excellent turret down positions, and moving into hull down, engaged the armoured cars that were now heading for the bridge into the town from the north. Two armoured cars were destroyed with the loss of one Locust from the Pak 40's firing from the hill. While the Locusts backed down into turret down positions away from the fire of the Pak 40's, the remainting two german vehicles managed to cross the bridge, joining the tracked vehicles that had crossed a stream and entered the village in the rear of the Locusts and recce's defending the south of the village. A wild melee developed as the Locusts in the south, who had decided to stand their ground, were overwhelmed by german infantry firing panzerfausts, throwing grenades, and by german half tracks punching through their rear armour with 20mm cannons.
In the meantime, also shortly after dawn, a company of 8 german tanks, a mix of five Mk IV and three Mk III's, along with several armoured half tracks, attacked the recces and a troop of Locusts still conducting Force Protection on the southeast side of Arnhem while waiting for 3rd Para Battalion to arrive on Route Leopard.
The recces were occupying buildings, with the locusts in hull down positions on the north side of the railroad embankment leading toward the blown rail bridge.
Just after dawn, an artillery barrage rained down on the british troops on the southeast outskirts, as a smoke screen built up blocking all visibility to the british front. Shortly after, the Mk III and Mk IV tanks ventured into the the smoke, over-running some dug-in men from the South Staffords, and forcing them to withdraw. They managed to disable one Mk IV at close quarters, though not destroying it. The rest of the tanks emerged from the smoke, within a few hundred meters of the Locusts at the railroad embankment. The Locusts, unable to do damage to the frontal armour of the Mk IV tanks, even with their littlejohns fitted, quickly withdrew into the streets of Arnhem, nearly losing one tank to a Mk IV in the process.
In the south, with Omerbegovacca no longer able to be held, it was decided to withdraw the elements of the regiment still fighting there back to the north side of the village of Serbodorf, and to bring the troops still in Arnhem there as well and consolidate the regiment and prepare for further operations.
At this point, it was heading for noon on Sunday in real time (yesterday), and the decision was made to do an assessment, and then bring Operation Garden Gnome to a close.
The assessment compared what happened with the introduction of "Stewart Force" into the historic order of battle for Operation Market Garden against what historically happened in the real battle.
Determinations were as follows:
1. It took Frost's men on foot with no heavy weapons or armour approximately 3 hours to get to Arnhem bridge, arriving just after Graebner's 30 armoured cars and half tracks had crossed the bridge. It took "Stewart Force" 1 hour to get to the bridge, with the Locust tanks easily dealing with the 25 soldiers and two 20mm flak guns guarding the bridge and crossing it, seizing the entire area around both ends of the bridge.
2. It was seized two hours before Graebner arrived at the bridge to cross it, allowing "Stewart Force" to drive through the remainder of Arnhem, reconning for more enemy soldiers and working their way toward the high ground outside the city, that was one of the objectives for the real battle of Arnhem.
3. The only SS formation in Arnhem was one company of troops, stationed in the northern part of the town. One of Stewart Force's patrols ran into this company and was ambushed by it, quickly withdrawing out of the ambush. The rest of Arnhem, virtually unoccupied (german policy was to place garrisons outside of towns, not in them), was quickly identified as clear and occupied by "Stewart Force", whose orders were "Seize and Hold" until relieved by the paras.
4. The regiment was quickly able to determine that there was no sign of a threat from the open polder land spreading off into the distance on the other side of Arnhem bridge. It was recognized that once the Para's had secured Arnhem, elements of the regiment (tank and recce troops) would be free to send patrols toward Nijmegen, only 11 miles away.
5. With only one kompany of soldiers in Arnhem, already identified, it was possible to send troops from the regiment as far as three kilometers from the city, without risk of being cut off, to provide early warning of enemy movements toward the city.
4. Two troops of locusts had been sent to the suburbs to guard against the german kompany that had been identified by the recce troop. This troop of locusts was in place when Kampfgruppe Graebner arrived with 30 armoured cars and half tracks, moving in column, on the road to the bridge with orders to cross it and go to Nijmegen. The leading Puma encountered one of the locusts on the road, beginning the engagement between the german and british forces there. The SS kompany there had identified the british as having tanks, and passed this info along to the armoured column when it arrived. The Puma also identified the tank as british.
After alot of pondering on the significance of this, we determined that these reports of british tanks in Arnhem would have been hard to believe by the german command. Further reports of contacts with british tanks in Omerbegovacca the next morning and at the railroad embankment in the rail bridge would have made the reluctancy of the german command to accept the accuracy of these reports hard to deny. Upon realizing the possibility that british tanks really were in Arnhem, they would have tried to establish how this was possible. They would have determined that somehow they had come in from the air, reached the area from the main XXX Corps advance which was still at Eindhoven, or that possibly an amphibious landing somewhere on the Dutch coast had taken place, and these tanks had made it inland all the way to Arnhem.
The germans had never seen a Locust. They had seen plenty of Shermans. When reporting the tanks, the german soldiers would very likely have thought the Locusts were shermans, as physically the Locust actually looks like a tiny sherman tank. If they had been reported as Shermans, we determined that the germans, knowing the whole city of Arnhem was in british hands, and that the british had sherman tanks there, would quite possibly have forced the germans to shift their priority of stopping XXX Corps at Nijmegen to forming a line on the Lower Rhine instead and stopping this armoured penetration already on the other side of the Rhine river.
5. In the game, by the morning of the 18th, it had already been demonstrated that the Locust with Littlejohn had no problem defeating german armoured cars and half tracks. It had also been demonstrated that they could not do much to a Mk IV, without being able to penetrate the Mk IV frontal armour. It became aparent that with only a few german tanks (eight total) in the Arnhem area of this quality, the Locust compared very favorably to the majority of the armour that the germans had, primarly the 30 armoured vehicles of Graebner's battalion. The Locust, with it's armour protection and firing cannister, was very effective against german infantry in the open. Our losses occured primarily from Pak 40 mounted in half tracks and 20mm firing from the rear, and infantry at close quarter in the battle at Omerbegovacca. Had the regiment strictly adhered to leaving the german armour to make attacks on infantry dugin backed by antitank guns and artillery, and only done battle, when it was necessary, on ground of it's own choosing and only against the lighter german forces and avoiding german tanks, it could have lasted for days, and made a large difference in keeping the corridor open between the forces at the bridge and the landing zones.
6. Had the landing zones been held and the corridor kept open, and Krafft's force been broken allowing all of 1st Para Brigade to hold Arnhem, the slaughter of three battalions trying to make it to the bridge on the morning of the 19th would not have happened. Had those three battalions been available to hold the perimeter, and 1st Polish Para Brigade been able to also drop into the perimeter instead of the south side of the river after the drop zones had been lost, it is also possible that 52nd Lowland division would have been flown in as planned.
7. Our determination was that if 6th Airborne Armoured Recce Regiment had been flown in on the first day and been organized the same way as "Parker Force" had been organized for June 7th in Normandy, it could clearly have made a different outcome in Operation Market Garden.
Following our assessment, Operation Garden Gnome was formally brought to a close.
...Pete and Susan arrived Friday night, and Toby, Kevin and Al Prendergast arrived Saturday morning. After a breakfast of Welch McMuffins, map boards, protractors, and copies of the operations order and game rules were handed out to the combatants. The operations order was briefed, and then a rehearsal conducted on the terrain board, along with a quick familiarization of the types of heavy weapons' ammunition available to the combatants. These included original examples of 37mm APBC, HE, Cannister, and Littlejohn squeezebore rounds, 2" and 3" mortar bombs, a 75mm pack howitzer casing, and a panzerschreck rocket to compare to a PIAT projectile.
The combatants took on the jobs of the commanders of 6th AARR Regimental, HQ Squadron, Tank Squadron, Recce Squadron, Royal Artillery, and A Co of the 2nd South Staffords, organized as "Stewart Force".
The operation started with a description of the events of the afternoon of 17th September 1944 from the German perspective, as the aerial bombardment and attacks by fighter bombers commenced in the Arnhem area, followed by the glider and parachute drops into the drop and landing zones. The dispositions of the german forces were briefed, along with the initial assessments of what the key german commanders thought was happening. The british unit commanders then deployed their forces on Landing Zone "Zulu", and assembled for their final briefing prior to mounting up and moving out on their missions.
Stewart force moved in Column along route "Lion", along the river road, with Recce Sqdn in the lead, followed by the Regimental Commander, then Lt Tank Sqdn, HQ Sqdn, A Co 2nd South Staffs, and the troops from the Royal Artillery, the Antitank Battery, and the Royal Engineers. Initial contact was with some german horse-drawn wagons on "Lion" in the vicinity of Phase Line "White", which were quickly dealt with. No other opposition was met while crossing Phase Lines "Cliffs" and "Dover", until the few germans and 20mm flak guarding the Arnhem road bridge were encounted at Objective "Black" were eliminated. The Tank and Recce troops quickly fanned out in the areas on both the north and south sides of the bridge, and sent troops to seize the railroad bridge at Objective "Tan" and to move south to recce the routes to Objective "Ale" on the high ground to the south of Arnhem. The rail bridge was blown as the forces approached, and a company of Waffen SS soldiers were encountered in an ambush on one of the Recce troops as they moved toward Objective "Ale" along route "Leopard". No casualties were suffered and the troop quickly withdrew and reported the contact.
The recce troop sent to check route "Puma" leading to the western end of Objective Ale encountered no opposition, and seized and held the village of Omerbegovacca and established a Firm Base there. They were given the mission of holding the town if possible and establishing OP's to report any enemy movements surrounding the village.
As A Co of the South Staffs picked up positions to relieve some of the light tank troops of their Force Protection missions guarding the perimeter and the HQ Squadron, Royal Artillery and Engineers established themselves, contact was made on Route Leopard as the leading elements of a german armoured reconnaissance battalion came over the crest of the hill to the south of Arnhem, as they headed north toward the bridge.
Fire was exchanged between the leading Puma armoured car and a locust tank from the 2nd Troop, with no hits scored. The artillery was quickly called and laid a barage on the armoured cars, who were caught in between the buildings on both sides of the road. Two Pumas were destroyed, and the german battalion deployed to both sides of the road, seeking bypasses around the british encountered.
The whole of the division's artillery was called onto the germans as they fanned out, and a few more vehicles were disabled or destroyed as a result. Darkness brought a halt to the combat on both sides and both sides reorganized and prepared for the following morning's action.
During the night, the Division Commander and his subordinates discussed the enemy's dispositions and the division's options. 2nd Parachute Battalion under Frost had made it to the bridge and relieved Task Force Stewart of the Seize and Hold mission. 1st and 3rd Parachute Battalions were unable to enter Arnhem, due to strong resistance by a Waffen SS formation identified as "Kampfgruppe Krafft". During the previous evening, two troops of Locusts had been sent to reinforce the recce troop that was in Omerbegovacca. Two further troops of locusts had been dispatched to Omerbegovacca, in anticipation of the german armoured recce battalion, now identified as "Kampfgruppe Graebner", attempting to make a flank attack on the divison's perimeter in the direction of Omerbegovacca, or with the possibility of launching our own flank attack into "Kampfgruppe Graebner".
With four troops of locusts and the Squadron commander and his wingman now in Omerbegovacca, and the presence of Kampfgruppe Krafft still blocking the 1st and 3rd Para Battalion Commanders, General Urquehart decided to order Col Stewart to attack the Kampfgruppe Kraft from the rear with his tanks, in concert with a push from the paras at dawn.
The attack was successful, brreaking the kamfgruppe in two, with the broken elements on the german south flank dispersing into the fields and woods to the south, and the germans on the north flank retreating into the village of Serbodorf. The german force in Serbodorf, now being reduced to two companies, and encircled on three sides by two battalions of paras with tanks in support, withdrew.
Routes Tiger and Leopard were now clear to the west of Arnhem, allowing the rest of 1st Parachute Brigade to enter the city to join 2nd Para and reinforce the perimeter.
While Col. Stewart had been conducting the attack against the rear of Kampfgruppe Krafft, a very heavy artillery barrage descended on the tankees and reccees holding Omerbegovacca, which a smoke screen blocking all vision of the areas to the south of the village. Shortly after, three companies of SS Panzergrenadiers supported by armoured half tracks and an 88mm and 20mm gun, emerged from the smoke at point blank range to the south of the village. At the same time, armoured cars and half tracks armed with 20mm cannon emerged from the high ground and woods to the east of the village, descending on the town from that direction, supported by half tracks mounting 75mm Pak 40's firing from the hill.
Col. Stewart had been ordered to return to Omerbegovacca by General Urquehart, and his tanks were just getting back to the village in the middle of the german attack. With the locusts in the south of the village along with Col Stewart firing cannister at the troops emerging from the smoke and the direct fire of the 3" armed HQ Tetrarch firing HE, many of the attacking infantry were cut down before reaching the village. One of the returning troops of Locusts had been ordered to reinforce the east side of the village against the attack from the east.
The troop commander picked up excellent turret down positions, and moving into hull down, engaged the armoured cars that were now heading for the bridge into the town from the north. Two armoured cars were destroyed with the loss of one Locust from the Pak 40's firing from the hill. While the Locusts backed down into turret down positions away from the fire of the Pak 40's, the remainting two german vehicles managed to cross the bridge, joining the tracked vehicles that had crossed a stream and entered the village in the rear of the Locusts and recce's defending the south of the village. A wild melee developed as the Locusts in the south, who had decided to stand their ground, were overwhelmed by german infantry firing panzerfausts, throwing grenades, and by german half tracks punching through their rear armour with 20mm cannons.
In the meantime, also shortly after dawn, a company of 8 german tanks, a mix of five Mk IV and three Mk III's, along with several armoured half tracks, attacked the recces and a troop of Locusts still conducting Force Protection on the southeast side of Arnhem while waiting for 3rd Para Battalion to arrive on Route Leopard.
The recces were occupying buildings, with the locusts in hull down positions on the north side of the railroad embankment leading toward the blown rail bridge.
Just after dawn, an artillery barrage rained down on the british troops on the southeast outskirts, as a smoke screen built up blocking all visibility to the british front. Shortly after, the Mk III and Mk IV tanks ventured into the the smoke, over-running some dug-in men from the South Staffords, and forcing them to withdraw. They managed to disable one Mk IV at close quarters, though not destroying it. The rest of the tanks emerged from the smoke, within a few hundred meters of the Locusts at the railroad embankment. The Locusts, unable to do damage to the frontal armour of the Mk IV tanks, even with their littlejohns fitted, quickly withdrew into the streets of Arnhem, nearly losing one tank to a Mk IV in the process.
In the south, with Omerbegovacca no longer able to be held, it was decided to withdraw the elements of the regiment still fighting there back to the north side of the village of Serbodorf, and to bring the troops still in Arnhem there as well and consolidate the regiment and prepare for further operations.
At this point, it was heading for noon on Sunday in real time (yesterday), and the decision was made to do an assessment, and then bring Operation Garden Gnome to a close.
The assessment compared what happened with the introduction of "Stewart Force" into the historic order of battle for Operation Market Garden against what historically happened in the real battle.
Determinations were as follows:
1. It took Frost's men on foot with no heavy weapons or armour approximately 3 hours to get to Arnhem bridge, arriving just after Graebner's 30 armoured cars and half tracks had crossed the bridge. It took "Stewart Force" 1 hour to get to the bridge, with the Locust tanks easily dealing with the 25 soldiers and two 20mm flak guns guarding the bridge and crossing it, seizing the entire area around both ends of the bridge.
2. It was seized two hours before Graebner arrived at the bridge to cross it, allowing "Stewart Force" to drive through the remainder of Arnhem, reconning for more enemy soldiers and working their way toward the high ground outside the city, that was one of the objectives for the real battle of Arnhem.
3. The only SS formation in Arnhem was one company of troops, stationed in the northern part of the town. One of Stewart Force's patrols ran into this company and was ambushed by it, quickly withdrawing out of the ambush. The rest of Arnhem, virtually unoccupied (german policy was to place garrisons outside of towns, not in them), was quickly identified as clear and occupied by "Stewart Force", whose orders were "Seize and Hold" until relieved by the paras.
4. The regiment was quickly able to determine that there was no sign of a threat from the open polder land spreading off into the distance on the other side of Arnhem bridge. It was recognized that once the Para's had secured Arnhem, elements of the regiment (tank and recce troops) would be free to send patrols toward Nijmegen, only 11 miles away.
5. With only one kompany of soldiers in Arnhem, already identified, it was possible to send troops from the regiment as far as three kilometers from the city, without risk of being cut off, to provide early warning of enemy movements toward the city.
4. Two troops of locusts had been sent to the suburbs to guard against the german kompany that had been identified by the recce troop. This troop of locusts was in place when Kampfgruppe Graebner arrived with 30 armoured cars and half tracks, moving in column, on the road to the bridge with orders to cross it and go to Nijmegen. The leading Puma encountered one of the locusts on the road, beginning the engagement between the german and british forces there. The SS kompany there had identified the british as having tanks, and passed this info along to the armoured column when it arrived. The Puma also identified the tank as british.
After alot of pondering on the significance of this, we determined that these reports of british tanks in Arnhem would have been hard to believe by the german command. Further reports of contacts with british tanks in Omerbegovacca the next morning and at the railroad embankment in the rail bridge would have made the reluctancy of the german command to accept the accuracy of these reports hard to deny. Upon realizing the possibility that british tanks really were in Arnhem, they would have tried to establish how this was possible. They would have determined that somehow they had come in from the air, reached the area from the main XXX Corps advance which was still at Eindhoven, or that possibly an amphibious landing somewhere on the Dutch coast had taken place, and these tanks had made it inland all the way to Arnhem.
The germans had never seen a Locust. They had seen plenty of Shermans. When reporting the tanks, the german soldiers would very likely have thought the Locusts were shermans, as physically the Locust actually looks like a tiny sherman tank. If they had been reported as Shermans, we determined that the germans, knowing the whole city of Arnhem was in british hands, and that the british had sherman tanks there, would quite possibly have forced the germans to shift their priority of stopping XXX Corps at Nijmegen to forming a line on the Lower Rhine instead and stopping this armoured penetration already on the other side of the Rhine river.
5. In the game, by the morning of the 18th, it had already been demonstrated that the Locust with Littlejohn had no problem defeating german armoured cars and half tracks. It had also been demonstrated that they could not do much to a Mk IV, without being able to penetrate the Mk IV frontal armour. It became aparent that with only a few german tanks (eight total) in the Arnhem area of this quality, the Locust compared very favorably to the majority of the armour that the germans had, primarly the 30 armoured vehicles of Graebner's battalion. The Locust, with it's armour protection and firing cannister, was very effective against german infantry in the open. Our losses occured primarily from Pak 40 mounted in half tracks and 20mm firing from the rear, and infantry at close quarter in the battle at Omerbegovacca. Had the regiment strictly adhered to leaving the german armour to make attacks on infantry dugin backed by antitank guns and artillery, and only done battle, when it was necessary, on ground of it's own choosing and only against the lighter german forces and avoiding german tanks, it could have lasted for days, and made a large difference in keeping the corridor open between the forces at the bridge and the landing zones.
6. Had the landing zones been held and the corridor kept open, and Krafft's force been broken allowing all of 1st Para Brigade to hold Arnhem, the slaughter of three battalions trying to make it to the bridge on the morning of the 19th would not have happened. Had those three battalions been available to hold the perimeter, and 1st Polish Para Brigade been able to also drop into the perimeter instead of the south side of the river after the drop zones had been lost, it is also possible that 52nd Lowland division would have been flown in as planned.
7. Our determination was that if 6th Airborne Armoured Recce Regiment had been flown in on the first day and been organized the same way as "Parker Force" had been organized for June 7th in Normandy, it could clearly have made a different outcome in Operation Market Garden.
Following our assessment, Operation Garden Gnome was formally brought to a close.
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Clockwise from top left; The first victims of the Recce Squadron - horse drawn transport on the road into Arnhem. Occupying the industreial area near the bridge. Locust and jeep moving down empty streets of Arnhem. Stewart force vickers gunners and 6 pounder setting up on the perimeter of the city. A troop of the Air Landing Light Artillery setup with its pack howitzers, ready to fire. Blunting Kampfgruppe Moeller in the industrial district: a locust burns. Pushing Kampfgruppe Krafft out of Serbodorf. Two burning tetrarchs after the battle with Kampfgruppe Krafft, but the road to Arnhem is now open for 1st and 3rd Para
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Left; Kampfgruppe Moeller, after losing 5 tanks to 6 pounders, PIATs, and close in infantry action, just before it begins its withdrawal out of Arnhem. Right; 2nd Troop of The Light Tank Squadron in its stubborn effort to hold onto Omerbegovacca. After thrashing the attacking infantry and half tracks of Kampfgruppe Spindler firing a mix of cannister and HE, it is finally overwhelmed by forces attacking from the north combined with amored cars and half tracks coming into their rear and firing 20mm cannons into the rear of their tanks. Three tanks of the Light Tank Squadron were lost in this fight. But the armour of 9th SS Panzer Division has been successfully drawn out of the city and away from the vital road bridge.
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VMMV Open House
16-18 August
Nokesville, VA
Although I was the only club member to attend the Virginia Museum of Military Vehicles Open House, I've included it here since one of us did attend, and it was fairly significant to our club. I was invited to attend by David Page of the Welsh Guards, who owns a restored and running Dingo, so that he could give me instruction on the finer points of Dingo maintenance and driving, so that I could learn from an experienced owner, and hopefully use that knowledge to not screw up ours once it's on the road. So I combined that trip with a run up to Michigan to bring back another universal carrier hull for our club to restore, and stocking up on vital club supplies in Arkansas before the return to Texas. Dave gave me many pointers on maintenance, a class on special tools he's made and how to use them, and two sessions of driving time behind the wheel, which I can tell you, for someone who has never driven one, this is a HUGE benefit of knowing someone who can instruct you while you're learning. Along with the Dingo training, I got to interact with the 15th Reconnaissance Regiment, the only other WW2 British armoured vehicle club like ours in the USA. They are a great bunch of guys, it was a wonderful opportunity to see how a club similar to ours operates in person, and hopefully we'll be able to operate together on projects in the future. I've included some photos here from the event.
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Of 100 or more vehicles at the open house, I have only included most of the WW2 british ones here. From top left; The Dingo line: Dingos warming up: First Parade vehicle inspection of 15th Recce and Welsh Guards: part of the british camp: BSA motorcycle, T-16 Universal Carrier and CMP 15 cwt Scout: Morris C-8 and Universal Carrier Mk 2: Valentine tank (yes, it runs!): and finally, another universal carrier.
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